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ELECTIONS, FISCAL POLICY AND GROWTH:
REVISITING THE MECHANISM
Abstract
This short paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower the probability
of getting reelected, the stronger the incumbent politicians’ incentive to follow
short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model
of endogenous growth and optimal fiscal policy, in which two political parties
can alternate in power. We show that re-election uncertainty is not enough to
produce the popular result. Specifically, re-election uncertainty must be
combined with the hypothesis that politicians care about economic outcomes
more when in power than when out of power, and - more importantly - that
this preference over being in power is ad hoc. That is, if politicians can also
choose how much to care about economic outcomes when in and out of
power, it is optimal to care the same and hence shortsighted policies do not
arise. Therefore, such policies presuppose a degree of irrationality on the
part of political parties.
JEL Classification: D9, E6, H1, H5.
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Policymakers are chosen for a finite term and know they will be replaced in 
the future by another policymakers. This affects their behavior in several ways.
1 One 
way is that uncertainty about remaining in office  induces policymakers to choose 
relatively short-sighted policies and this is bad for macroeconomic performance [see 
e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Lockwood et al. (1996), Devereux and Wen (1998) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1999)]. The lower the probability of getting reelected, the 
stronger the incumbent’s incentive to follow short-sighted, inefficient policies. Here, 
inefficiency takes the form of too big governments and changes in spending patterns 
in favor of non-productive government expenditures (e.g. public consumption, 
transfers and subsidies).
2   
This short paper reconsiders the underlying mechanism and shows that re-
election uncertainty is not enough to produce these realistic results. Specifically, re-
election uncertainty must be combined with t he hypothesis that political parties care 
about economic outcomes more when in power than when out of power, and - more 
importantly  - that this preference over being in power is ad hoc (i.e. exogenously set). 
If politicians can also choose how much to care about economic outcomes when in 
and out of power, it is optimal to care the same, so that inefficient policies do not arise 
(at least in the context used by the literature). In other words, in addition to electoral 
uncertainty, we also have to assume a degree of irrationality or  fiscal illusion  on the 
part of political parties. By contrast, the existing literature (implicitly or explicitly) 
states that a bias towards short-sighted policies can arise even if policymakers act 
rationally, and their time horizon and discount factor coincide with those of the 
society.   
The model is as follows. We use a general equilibrium model of endogenous 
growth and optimal fiscal policy, where the incumbent government imposes income 
taxes to finance public consumption services (that provide direct utility to households) 
and public production services (that provide Barro-type production externalities to 
                                                                 
1 See Drazen (2000, chapter 7) for a review of the main (positive and negative) macroeconomic effects 
of elections. For the “New Political Economy”, see the recent books by Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
and Drazen (2000).  
2 Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) provide empirical evidence. Mueller (1989, chapter 17) and Alesina 
(1999) discuss a number of political economy arguments that can explain the data (e.g. short-sighted 
policies, politically influential lobbies, bureaucracy, etc). Here we focus on short-sighted policies. Note 
that these arguments can explain systematic, long-term changes in the size and role of government, not 




private firms). Two political parties can alternate in power as a result of elections. The 
elected party forms a government  that sets economic policy during term in office. The 
parties have the same objective and are benevolent. However, we allow them (if they 
wish) to care differently about economic outcomes
3 when in and out of power. The 
parties play Nash vis-à-vis each other. We solve for Markov strategies that are time 
consistent. Thus, the Political General Equilibrium (PGE) is Markov perfect. This is a 
fully dynamic and rather generalized model.    
  We first solve for a PGE in which the incumbent party chooses only the tax 
rate and the allocation of tax revenues between productive and non-productive 
services during term in office. This is for any weights given to economic outcomes in 
and out of power. Then, we can get the standard result of the literature (i.e. as the 
probability of getting reelected decreases, policymakers choose short-sighted policies, 
here in the form of high total expenditure-to-output ratio and low share of tax 
revenues used to finance production services), only if we assume that the parties care 
about economic outcomes more when in than when out of power. If it so happens and 
they care the same, economic policies are independent of reelection probabilities and 
so we get the second-best solution without effects from political uncertainty.
4 
We then  ask the natural question, “What is the optimal choice of the weights 
given to economic outcomes in and out of power?” In our two-state dynamic 
programming problem solved by political parties, this can be easily determined by the 
appropriate smooth pasting conditions. These conditions imply that it is optimal for 
the political parties to care about economic outcomes equally whether in or out of 
power. Therefore, short-sighted policies are not consistent with rational behavior.  
Our results get support from the political science literature [see e.g. Laver and 
Hunt (1992)], which provides evidence for fiscal illusion or myopia on the part of 
political parties. They are also similar to the results of the early literature on political 
economy, according to which  politicians do act in ways that imply that either 
themselves suffer from fiscal illusion, or that they believe voters are myopic, or both 
[see e.g. Mueller (1989, chapters 14 and 17)].  
                                                                 
3 In particular, about private consumption and public consumption services, which are the economic 
outcomes included in households’ utility function.  
4 Here, the two political parties have the same objective. By contrast, in Alesina and Tabellini (1990) 
and Devereux and Wen (1998), the parties have different objectives (they care about different public 
goods or care differently about the same public goods); this effectively means that they are assumed to 
care differently about policy outcomes in and out of power.  Lockwood et al.  (1996) make this 




The rest of the paper is as follows.  Section II solves for a competitive 
equilibrium.  Section III solves for optimal fiscal policies. Section IV concludes.   
 
II.  THE ECONOMY AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM  
 
Consider a closed economy with a private sector and two political parties. The 
private sector consists of a representative household and a representative firm. The 
household consumes, works and saves in the form of capital. The firm uses capital 
and labor to produce a single good. The elected party forms a government, which 
finances the provision of public services by taxing the household’s income. We 
assume discrete time and infinite time-horizons for both private agents and politicians. 















                                                                                                            (1a) 
 
where  ct and  ht are respectively private consumption and public consumption at time 
t , and the parameter  0 1 < < b  is the discount rate. The instantaneous utility function 
u(.)  is increasing and concave, and also satisfies the Inada conditions.  For algebraic 
simplicity, we assume that u(.)  is additively separable and logarithmic.    
 
u c h c h t t t t ( , ) log log = +d                                                                                          (1b) 
 
where the parameter  0 ‡ d  is the weight given to public consumption services relative 
to private consumption.  
At any period  t, the household rents its predetermined capital,  kt, to the firm 




inelastically one unit of labor services so that the labor income is  wt . Further, it 
receives profits, pt. Thus, the household’s budget constraint at t  is:   
 
( )( ) k c r k w t t t t t t t + + = - + + 1 1 q p                                                                                (2) 
 
where  1 0 < < t q  is the income tax rate. For algebraic simplicity, we assume full 
capital depreciation. The initial capital stock, k0, is given.  
The household acts competitively by taking prices, tax policy and public 
services as given. We will solve this problem by dynamic programming. From the 
household’s viewpoint, the state variables at time  t  are the predetermined capital 
stock,  kt , and current economic policy. As we show below, the independent policy 
instruments at  t  are the current tax rate,  t q , and the current share of total tax revenues 
used to finance public production services,  t b . Then, let  ( ) t t t b k V , ;q  denote the value 
function of the household at t . This value function must satisfy the Bellman equation:  
  
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 ,   ; log log max , ;
1   ,
+ + + + + =
+
t t t t t
k c
t t t b k V h c b k V
t t
q b d q                                              (3) 
 
Using (2) for  ct  into (3), the first-order condition for  kt+1 and the envelope 
condition for kt are respectively:  
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Firms   
Following the class of models introduced by Barro (1990), we assume that 
public services provide production externalities to private firms and technology at the 
firm’s level takes a Cobb-Douglas form. Thus, the production function of the 
representative firm is:
5  
                                                                 





t t t k Ag y
- =
1                                                                                                              (5) 
 
where gt  is public production services at t , and  A>0 and 0 1 < < a  are parameters. 
The firm maximizes profits, pt, given by:   
 
p t t t t t y r k w ” - -                                                                                                        (6) 
 
The firm acts competitively by taking prices and public services as given. This 
is a simple static problem. The first-order conditions, that also imply zero profits, are:  
 
1 1 - - =
a a a t t t k Ag r                                                                                                         (7a) 
a a a t t t k Ag w
- - =
1 ) 1 (                                                                                                 (7b) 
 
Government budget constraint   
At each  t , the government runs a balanced budget by taxing the household’s 
income at a rate  1 0 < < t q .
6  Since h g t t +  is total expenditures, we have:   
 
( ) h g rk w t t t t t t t + = + + q p                                                                                         (8a) 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that a share  1 0 < < t b  o f total tax 
revenues finances public production services,  gt, and the rest  1 1 0 < - < t b  finances 
public consumption services, ht.  Thus, (8a) is decomposed into: 
 
( ) t t t t t t t w k r b g p q + + =                                                                                             (8b) 
( ) ( ) t t t t t t t w k r b h p q + + - = 1                                                                                      (8c) 
 
where (8a)-(8c) make clear that  t q  and  t b  fully summarize economic policy at any 






Competitive decentralized equilibrium (given economic policy)   
Given 
¥
=0 } , { t t t b q  and initial conditions, a Competitive Decentralized 
Equilibrium  (CDE) is defined to be a sequence of allocations 
¥
= + 0 1 } , ,   , { t t t t t g h c k  and 
prices  { , } r w t t t   =
¥
0 such that: (i) households maximize utility and firms maximize 
profits, given prices and policy; (ii) all markets clear; (iii) all budget constraints are 
satisfied. This CDE is characterized by (1)-(8) above. The rest of this section will take 
advantage of the specific functional forms used to get a convenient closed-form 
analytic solution for this CDE.  
In particular, we have:
7 
 
Result 1: In a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (given any Markov economic 
policy), optimal private consumption and capital accumulation are:
 8     
( ) ( )( ) t t t t t k b A c a
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1 1                                                                                    (9b) 
 
It is also useful for what follows to present the solution for the two types of 
public services,  gt and  ht, in a CDE. Using (5), (7a) and (7b) into (8b) and (8c), we 
get:   
 
t t t t k Ab g a q
1
) ( =                                                                                                         (9c) 






- =                                                                                          (9d) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Thus, there is no public debt.  This is for simplicity.     
7 We work as follows: In a CDE, the structure of the problem implies a conjecture of the value function 
in (3) of the form  ( ) t t t t t t t b u u u k u u b k V log log log ,   ; 4 3 2 1 0 + + + + = q q q , where 
4 3 2 1 0 , , , , u u u u u  are undetermined coefficients. Then, the optimality conditions (4a)-(4b)  - together 
with (5), (6), (7a)-(7b) and (8b) - give (9b) and in turn (9a) via (2). Plugging (9a)-(9b) back into (3) and 
equating coefficients on both sides of the Bellman, we can solve for  4 3 2 1 0 , , , , u u u u u . Note that while 
we can solve for  1 u  at this stage, we cannot solve for  4 3 2 0 , , , u u u u  before we also solve for optimal 
policy in the next section. This is how it should be in a general equilibrium model where policy is 
endogenously chosen. See also Kollintzas et al. (2000), Asteriou et al. (2000) and Malley et al. (2001).   
8 This closed-form solution follows from the structure of the model: log-linear utility functions, Cobb-




We sum up this section. Equations (9a), (9b), (9c) and (9d) give  ct ,  kt+1,  gt 
and  ht respectively in a CDE. This is for any Markov fiscal policy, where the latter is 
summarized by the current tax rate,  q t, and the current allocation of tax revenues 
between public production and public consumption services,  t b . The next section will 
endogenize the choice of  q t  and  t b . Note that the CDE is a function of the current 
state only (i.e. the predetermined capital stock,  t k , and the current policy instruments, 
q t and  t b ). This will  make the political parties’ optimization problem recursive and 
hence policies will be time consistent.
9 
 
III.  FISCAL POLICY AND POLITICAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM  
 
To endogenize economic policy, we form a Nash game between two political 
parties, denoted by  i and  j , which can alternate in power according to an exogenous 
reelection probability.
10  For simplicity, elections take place each time-period.
11 Thus, 
the party in power at time  t  has a probability  0 1 £ £ q  of winning the next election 
and remaining in power in the next time-period  t +1, and a probability  0 1 1 £ - £ q  
of losing the next election and remaining out of power at  t +1. The elected party 
chooses the current policy instruments,  t q  and  t b , to maximize the utility of the 
representative household.
12 In doing so, it plays Stackelberg  vis-a-vis the private 
sector. It also plays Nash  vis-a-vis the other political party, which may be in power in 
the future.  
In particular, the Political General Equilibrium (PGE) is defined as follows:  
(i) Each time-period  t, the elected party  i chooses  t q  and  t b  to maximize (1a)-(1b) 
subject to the CDE, i.e. equations (9a)-(9d), and by taking as given the policy of the 
                                                                 
9 See also Kollintzas et al. (2000).  
10 Having endogenous reelection probabilities would not change our main results. For instance, assume 
that the reelection probability increases with current growth. This would give an incentive to the party 
in power to follow more long-sighted policies (so as to stimulate growth) than in the case in which the 
reelection probability is exogenous, but it would still be the case that, since the reelection probability is 
less than one, policies are less long-sighted than in the case without electoral uncertainty. In general, 
although there is feedback from policy and the state of the economy to reelection probabilities, the 
assumption that this probability is exogenous “means t hat there is some underlying exogenous 
stochastic process that makes the outcomes of elections uncertain” [see Drazen (2000, p. 256)].  
11 See also Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Devereux and Wen (1998) for a similar electoral calendar.  
Lockwood et al. (1996) use a richer model in which the electoral cycle lasts two time-periods so that 
the elected party can remain in power for two periods. Our main results do not depend on this.    




other party,  i j „ , which may be in power at  t +1.  (ii) We solve for symmetric Nash 
equilibria. That is, policy s trategies will be symmetric ex post.
13  (iii) We solve for 
Markov policy strategies.  That is,  q t and  t b  will be functions of the current value of 
the economy-wide state variables. Note that this also confirms the solution to the 
private agents’ optimization problem in the previous section (see Result 1 above).  
(iv) The solution for  q t and  t b , in combination with the Competitive Decentralized 
Equilibrium above, will give a Markov-perfect PGE.
14 
 
Problem formulation   
We will solve the problem by using dynamic programming. From the political 
parties’ viewpoint, the state variable at any time  t  is the economy’s inherited stock of 
capital, kt . Let  ) ( t
P k V
i  and  ) ( t
N k V
i  be respectively the value functions of being 
in and out of power for party  i at time  t . Then,  ) ( t
P k V
i  and  ) ( t
N k V
i  must satisfy 
the following pair of simultaneous Bellman equations:
15   
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N k qV k V q h c k V
i i i b b d g                       (10b) 
 
where  ct ,  kt+1 and  ht follow (9a), (9b) and (9d) respectively, and  1 0 £ <g  is the 
weight given to current economic outcomes when in power relative to out of power 
(see also below). 
  Inspection of the above problem reveals that we have to solve a dynamic 
programming problem with a log-linear payoff function and Cobb-Douglas 
constraints. Thus, the functional formulation of the policymakers’ problem is similar 
to that of the private agents’. This means that the value functions in (10a)-(10b) are 
expected to be of the log-linear form  t
P P
t
P k u u k V log ) ( 1 0 + =  and  t
N N
t
N k u u k V log ) ( 1 0 + = , 
where 
N N P P u u u u 1 0 1 0 , , ,  are undetermined coefficients.  
 
                                                                 
13 Thus, we do not study partisan effects. This is because we want to focus on how electoral uncertainty 
affects the economy.     
14 This PGE is similar to that in Asteriou et al. (2000). 




Optimal fiscal policy and political general equilibrium   
  Using the above conjecture for the value functions into (10a)-(10b), 
differentiating the right-hand side of (10a) with respect to  q t and  t b , imposing the 








t b b b ” = , 
P Pj Pi u u u ” =  and 
N Nj Ni u u u ” = , 
plugging the optimality conditions back into (10a)-(10b) and equating coefficients on 
both sides of the Bellman equations, we solve for 
N N P P u u u u 1 0 1 0 , , , .
16 Note that this also 
completes the solution for the CDE above. We therefore have:   
 
Result 2:  There is a unique Markov-perfect political general equilibrium in Nash 
strategies among political parties. In this equilibrium, the income tax rate,  t q , and the 
share of total tax revenues used to finance public production services,  t b , are 
constant over time and equal to:
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The channel through which the reelection probability,  q, affects the policy 
instruments,  q  and  b, is the “effective discount rate”,  W. Recall that it is the sign of 
q ¶
W ¶
 that drives the results in the existing literature. Specifically, (11c)-(11e) imply 
that the effect of  q on  W depends on the magnitude of  g , where  g  measures how 
much political  parties care about economic outcomes when they are in power relative 
                                                                 
16 See Asteriou et al. (2000) for details.  
17 Thus, it is optimal to keep policy instruments flat over time. This is a tax smoothing result. This type 













. In other words, if the political parties care about economic outcomes more in 
than out of power (i.e.  5 . 0 > g ), the effective discount rate increases with the 
reelection probability. If the parties care the same whether in or out of power (i.e. 
5 . 0 = g ), the effective discount rate is independent of election outcomes. If the 
political parties care about economic outcomes more out than in power (i.e.  5 . 0 < g ), 
the effective discount rate decreases with the reelection probability. As argued above, 




.      
Therefore, we can get the popular result only if we assume  5 . 0 > g . In this 























18  In other words, as the probability of 
being reelected increases, the total government expenditures-to-output ratio and the 
associated required tax rate,  q ,  decrease, while the share of tax revenues used to 
finance government production services,  b, increases. In turn, a lower  q  and a higher 
b work in the same direction and stimulate economic growth.  
We summarize results in the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 1:  Given Result 2, (i) When political parties c are about economic 
outcomes more when in power than out of power, then the lower the reelection 
probability, the stronger the policymakers’ incentive to follow short-sighted inefficient 
policies, and this is bad for economic growth. (ii) These results are reversed, when 
political parties care about economic outcomes more when out than in power. (iii) 
When political parties care about economic outcomes the same irrespectively of 
whether they are in or out of power, economic policies are independent of reelection 
probabilities and there are no policy distortions.   
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 from (11a), it follows that if 




















































Optimal choice of g  
Therefore, the presence of distorted policies depends crucially on the 
magnitude of  g . But what is the optimal value of  g ? That is, what happens if political 
parties are also free to choose g  optimally in (10a)-(10b) above?  
The optimal choice of  g  can be determined by the smooth pasting condition 




k k V k V = .
19 In other words, 
N P u u 1 1 =  as defined in (11d) and (11e). But 
N P u u 1 1 =  implies  5 . 0 = g . That is, it is optimal for political parties to care about 
outcomes the same irrespectively of whether they are in power or not. Intuitively, if 
the p arties were fully rational, they would like to eliminate the impact of electoral 
uncertainty.    
We summarize results in the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 2:  Given Proposition 1 above, if the political parties also choose 
optimally the weights given to economic outcomes when in and out of power, short-
sighted policies do not arise.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS   
 
This paper has reconsidered the effect of electoral uncertainty on fiscal policy 
and economic outcomes. We showed that the popular result of the existing literature 
(i.e. a lower reelection probability leads to short-sighted policies and low growth) can 
follow only if we also assume that political parties care about economic outcomes 
more when in power than out of power, and - more importantly  - that this preference 
over being in power is  ad hoc. If the political parties can also choose how much to 
care about economic outcomes in and out of power, it is optimal to care the same. We 
report that these results are rather robust. For instance, we have experimented with 
various objective functions by adding more arguments in the policymakers’ 
instantaneous utility function in (10a)-(10b) above. Even if policymakers’ objective 
                                                                 
19 Recall that we have two inter-linked dynamic programming problems (see (10a)-(10b)). Then, as is 
known, there are two types of optimality conditions: value-matching and smooth-pasting. Value-
matching conditions ensure a smooth and optimal transition from one regime to another (here, from 
being in power to being out of power, and vice versa). This has been already satisfied by solving 
simultaneously for the undetermined coefficients  N N P P u u u u 1 0 1 0 , , , . Smooth-pasting conditions  ensure 




differs from that of the society, the results do not change. That is, it is again optimal to 
choose “the effective” g  so as to eliminate the impact of electoral uncertainty. 
Therefore, to get short-sighted, inefficient economic policies (e.g. an  excessive 
size of government and an inefficient composition of its spending), we need more 
than one distortion [see also the discussion in Mueller (1989, p. 343)]. Here, in 
addition to electoral uncertainty, we needed  a degree of irrationality or fiscal illusion 
on the part of political parties.  Of course, there can be other possible 
distortions/explanations. For instance, in Laffont (2000), asymmetric information is 
the additional distortion.
20 Or, we may need to assume that incumbent politicians have 
more in their objective functions than just the desire to get re-elected.
21  
                                                                 
20 However, it is difficult to believe that informational advantages on the part of policymakers can 
explain e.g. the systematic growth of public sectors in the last 40 years.    
21 For instance, bureaucrats do not need to be elected at all. Or maybe there are “rents” associated with 
office-holding per se [see e.g. Mueller (1989) and Drazen (2000)]. At a formal level, see Persson et al. 
(2000) for a rich model in which politicians are driven by their own selfish objectives, there is no direct 
democracy so that citizens delegate policy decisions to policy-makers, and political candidates cannot 
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